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1 Introduction 
This study1 is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some 
of the prominent features of an international economic system. The concept of multi-
pie "countries" in which each country has its own technology, preferences and resource 
endowments, is introduced and operationalized. The questions posed in the study are 
related to the law of comparative advantage, factor price equalization, terms of trade, 
efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and 
the effects of tariffs on international transactions. The study builds on previous work in 
the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena.2 
1The authors wish to acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation and the 
Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. The authors also thank Charles 
Holt for his comments as the discussant of this paper at the meetings of the Allied Social Science 
Association in New Orleans, January, HJ!J2. 
2Goodfellow and Plott(1989) investigat.e the simultaneous determination of input and output prices. 
Lian and Plott(l990)1 create a macroeconomy which includes one input and one output as well as fiat 
money and bonds. 
Because this paper carries laboratory experimental research to a new dimension of 
complexity and into a new field, it might be useful to address what would be the ob­
vious concern of a skeptic. Since the world's international economies are vastly more 
complicated than the economies created for this study, of what relevance are laboratory 
generated data? The answer is that laboratory experiments are not attempts to simulate 
field situations, as that question of the skeptic seems to presume. Laboratory research 
deals with the general theories and the general principles that are supposed to apply to 
all economies, the economies found in the field, as well as those created in a laboratory. 
The laboratory economies are very simple and are special cases of the broad class of 
(often complex) economies to which the general theories are supposed to be of relevance. 
If a general theory does not work to successfully explain behavior in the simple and spe­
cial cases of the laboratory then it is not general. When a model is found not working 
opportunity exists to modify the theory to account for the data or to reject the theory. 
Thus, the laboratory provides an arena in which competing notions and theories about 
the nature of human (and market) capacities can be joined with data. Clearly laboratory 
experimental work is constrained by technology and by background experimental work. 
When very little background work exists the experimental research strategy is to first 
explore what seem to be the most basic and general theoretical ideas. Then, as technol­
ogy permits, successful ideas can be challenged with increasingly complex experimental 
environments in follow up experiments. Any laboratory experiment should be viewed as 
only one of the many steps needed to learn what we would like to know. This study is 
no different. 
2 
The focus of the study is the behavior of the entire economic system rather than 
the behavior of individual agents. Two behavioral models, "competitive equilibrium" 
and "autarky" can be applied to the experimental environments. Both models make 
precise predictions of the magnitude of every variable in the system, which number in 
the dozens. The existence of such a large number of predictions creates methodological 
and expositional problems. With a large number of predictions, some predictions will 
almost certainly be wrong. The sheer size of the undertaking makes it very easy to reject 
the models statistically. Therefore, after making a clear statement of the negative result 
that the models are rejected, the analysis of the data focuses on the general properties 
of interdependent markets that are suggested by the models, as opposed to a focus on 
the accuracy of the specific predictions of each model. In the context of the broad 
implications of the models, a number of results are stated. 
The paper is organized in the following ma.nner: In sections 2 and 3, the design of the
experiments are described. In section 4, the theoretical models are discussed. In section 
5, the data are presented and analyzed, and in section 6, the conclusions are summarized. 
2 Experimental Design: Parameters 
This section consists of a description of the market conditions within which the economic 
activity occurs. The description includes the environment, the parameters, and the form 
of market organization used to facilitate transactions. There are two environments: the 
3 
first is motivated by the environment of the Ricardian Model of international trade,3 the 
second is a similar environment, within which the robustness of results can be investi-
gated and in which the properties of input markets can be considered in greater detail. 
All markets were organized through the computerized Multiple Unit Double Auction 
(MUDA). For details of the operation of this form of market organization, the reader can 
consult Plott (1991). 
Money exists in both environments. Thus, the first environment, although similar to 
that of the Ricardian model, differs in that the purchase of any good requires money. 
Money is included i n  the design because it is an obvious feature of any well-functioning 
market process, including international economies, and it is certainly useful in experi-
mental environments in facilitating equilibration. In both environments, there is only one 
currency and it has value as a commodity. All experimental currency held by subjects 
at the end of the experiment could be converted into dollars that the subject keeps as 
compensation for participation in the experiment. Since the focus of this line of experi-
mentation is international trade rather than finance, the complicating feature of multiple 
currencies has been omitted from the design. 
Table 1 presents the experimental parameters for both of the environments that will 
be discussed below. Continuous approximations of the utility functions of both consumers 
and producers are quadratic and additively separable as shown in Table l. The actual 
redemption values that were induced are contained in Table 2. Production technologies 
3For a clear exposition of the Ricardian Model see Caves, Frenkel and Jones (1990), chapter 5. For 
a fascinating account of the development of the Ricardian Model see Chipman (1965). 
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TABLE 2: RED E MPTION VALU E S, ALL A G ENTS, TWO ENVIR ONMENTS, 
ONE C OUNTRY (IDENTICAL C OUNTRI E S), ALL UNITS 
Environment 1 Environment 2 
Agent 
Consumer y z Consumer y z Producer L K 
600 620 1 600 450 1 600 450 
520 540 250 400 250 400 
440 480 200 50 200 50 
360 400 
280 320 2 550 500 2 550 500 
200 240 300 350 300 350 
120 160 150 100 150 100 
40 80 
3 500 550 3 500 550 
560 660 350 300 350 300 
480 580 100 150 100 150 
400 500 
320 420 4 450 600 4 450 600 
240 340 400 250 400 250 
180 260 50 200 50 200 
100 180 
20 100 
20 
560 660 
480 580 
400 500 
320 420 
240 340 
180 260 
100 180 
20 100 
20 
520 700 
440 620 
360 540 
280 460 
200 380 
120 300 
40 220 
140 
GO 
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are linear as in Table 1. In the tables, valuations are given in francs (a common name 
for an experimental currency). The francs are converted into dollars according to ratios 
known privately to agents. These conversions can differ across agents and are contained 
in Table 1. The variables Li and J(i refer to the factors L and K residing in country i and 
Y; and Zi refer to the outputs Y and Z produced in country i. The endowment listed in
the table is the amount each individual agent possesses at the beginning of each market 
period. A country's total endowment is then four times the amount listed in the table 
since each of the same type of agent has the same endowment. 
2.1 Environment 1 
Environment 1 is motivated by the Ricardian Model. In environment 1, there are two 
output goods (final goods) called Y and Z and an input called L. There are two types 
of agents: consumers and producers. Consumers are owners of the factors of production 
and have induced preferences for consuming the outputs Y and Z. Producers also have 
an initial endowment of the input and can earn profits by using the input L to produce 
and then sell Y and Z. All agents can also attempt to earn profits by speculating in any 
input or output. Neither consumers nor producers have preferences for L other than its
value as an input. 
Agents are divided in equal numbers into two countries. Each country includes as 
members equal numbers of consumers and producers. The factor of production is not 
mobile between countries. The final goods Y and Z can be traded in either country, 
not only the one in which they were produced. The two countries differ only in their 
production technologies. 
The economy works in the following way. Consumers sell their endowment of L 
to producers in their own country and then buy units of Y and Z produced in either
country. Consumers get utility (U.S. dollars) from consumption and any profits made 
in price speculation. Producers in each country buy L from the consumers in their own 
country and can use L to produce Y and Z which they can sell to consumers in either
country. Producers get utility (dollars) from profits earned from market and production 
activities. 
In some experiments free international trade was permitted; in others a tariff was 
imposed on the imports of Z to country 1. When a tariff was in effect, it took the form of 
a tax of 400 francs on international transactions of the final goods. The tariff revenue was 
not redistributed to citizens in either country but instead was taken by the experimenter. 
Thus, the tariff operated similarly to a transportation cost. 
2.2 Environment 2 
In environment 2, the two countries have different endowments of the inputs. In addi­
tion, the inputs are endogenously and elastically supplied to producers in the sense that 
resources could also be consumed. Environment 2 operated as a control on environment 1 
to ensure that any properties of input markets observed in environment 1 were not simply 
8 
due to the completely inelastic supply of the input. The endogenous resource property 
of environment 2 is a natural feature to add as a check on robustness of a model's ability 
to capture observed behavior because it is a general property of the field economies in 
which the Competitive and Autarky models are regularly applied. 
In environment 2 there are two output goods called Y and Z and two inputs called L 
and K. There are also two types of agents: consumers and producers. As in environment 
1, consumers are also owners of the factors of production. Consumers are endowed with 
some of both of the inputs L and K. Consumers have induced preferences for consuming 
the outputs Y and Z. Producers of the final goods are also consumers of the factors of 
production. They have no initial endowment but have preferences induced for consuming 
the inputs L and K and also for the money they might get by producing Y from L and 
Z from K and selling the output.
Participants are divided equally into two countries. Each country has an equal number 
of consumers and producers. Both types of agents can trade the inputs L and K only 
with agents in their own country. The final goods Y and Z can be traded internationally. 
No tariffs existed in any of the experiments in which environment 2 was implemented. 
Consumers sell their endowment of inputs to producers in their own country and 
consumers buy units of Y and Z produced in either country. Producers can buy L and K 
from consumers in their own country. Producers can consume any part of the purchases 
of Land K and can use the remainder to produce Y and Z, which they can then sell in
either country. 
3 Experimental Design: Procedures 
A total of ten experiments were conducted. Table 3 provides a summary of treatments. 
Experiments are indexed by the date of the experiment. Two subject pools were used. 
The experiments involved both 8 people and 16 people. The smaller numbers were 
dictated by cost and difficulties in recruiting subjects. 
In the conditions of environments 1 and 2, there were six and eight market4 respec-
tively operating simultaneously. Each variable had its own market, e.g., output Y;, Y 
produced in country i, had its own market. The production process allowed subjects to 
transfer units frorn and to inventories of certain markets in fixed ratios. Production was 
accomplished through a series of key strokes. To consume units, subjects held them in 
their inventory at the end of a market period. 
Subjects, undergraduates at the California Institute of Technology and at the Univer-
sity of Iowa, had at least one half hour of prior training in use of MUDA. 5 The MUDA 
software is  accompanied by a tutorial that explains the key functions to subjects and 
lets subjects practice using the keys in an environment containing randomly behaving 
robots. Appendix A contains instructions read to subjects. During period 0 and period 1 
accounting records were checked carefully for mistakes and spot checks were conducted 
4The names L and K were not used to label the markets in any experiments because they might 
suggest behavior to the subjects if subject thought that L and K represented labor and capital. The 
labels used in markets are explained in Appendix A. 
5 Although Caltech subjects were only allowed to participate in one experiment in this particular line 
of experimentation, some of the Caltech subjects had been in other market experiments. None of the U. 
of Iowa subjects had been in other market experiments previously, although experiments 041391A and 
041391B used only subjects who had been in one of the previous experiments in the series. 
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTS 
Exp.No.( date) Tariffs y/n Periods Environment Subj. Pool No. Subjects 
030591 N II I Caltech 8 
040191 N 10 I Caltech 8 
041191 N 9 1 U.Iowa. 16 
041391A N 10 1 U.lowa (exper.r 16 
032091 y 10 1 Caltech 8 
041091 y 9 I U.Iowa 16 
0413918 y 10 1 U.lowa (exper.r 8 
0112890 N 9 2 Caltech 16 
113090 N II 2 Caltech 16 
011891 N 10 2 Caltech 16 
·subjects had experience in one of the earlier experiments listed here. 
11 
in later periods. 
The experiment was divided into trading periods, at the beginning of each of which, 
subjects received new endowments and redemption values which were the same each 
period. At the beginning of the experiment there was a long practice period (period 0) 
for 15 mins. in which no money was paid. Market periods averaged 10 minutes in length. 
4 Models 
Some of the models described below rely on strong assumptions. The complex environ­
ments of the experimental markets are much richer than those that the models describe. 
However, experimental economics has demonstrated that models frequently have surpris­
ing power even when applied to environments much more complex than the structure 
of the models. The questions that will ultimately be posed concern the identification of 
models that can provide intuition needed for help with the interpretation of market data. 
4.1 The Competitive Model 
This section contains a brief elaboration and review of the competitive model. The 
computation and description of the competitive equilibria for both environments are in 
Appendix C. Recall that the first environment has two outputs, both of which can be 
produced with the same input, paralleling that of the Ricardian Model of international 
12 
trade. In the Ricardian environment there are two final goods, Y and Z, each of which are 
produced by one factor, L. There are two countries which may differ in their endowments 
of the factor. The factor cannot cross national boundaries, and is supplied inelastically to 
the markets. The two countries are assumed to have different production functions so that 
each country has a comparative advantage in production of one of the goods. Without 
loss of generality, call the country with a comparative advantage in the production of 
Y country 1. The two countries have identical aggregate demand for both goods. In
autarky, the price ratio ?,: should be greater in country 1 than in country 2. That is, 
country 1 can produce good Y more cheaply in terms of good Z then can country 2. 
If trade between the two countries is permitted, then comparative advantage dictates 
than country 1 specializes in and exports good Y. Similarly, country 2 specializes in and 
exports good Z. If the final goods are traded without restrictions, the prices of the final 
goods, Y and Z, will be the same across countries and the price of L generally will be 
different in each country. 
Thus, for environment 1, the competitive model predicts that countries 1 and 2 would
produce exclusively goods Y and Z respectively and that each of the two countries would
be a net exporter of the output which it produces. In particular country 1 would produce
only Y and country 2 would produce only Z. The prices of the outputs would be equal in 
each country according to the model and the prices of inputs would equal their marginal 
revenue products. 
If a tariff were imposed on the country l imporlti of Z in environff1ent 1, then according
to the competitive model international trade of Z would decline. The price of Z in country 
13 
1 would increase and the price of Z in country 2 would fall. The input price in country 2 
would also decline since its marginal revenue product would be lower. The tariff imposed 
was 400 francs. 
In environment 2, the competitive model predicts that each country would produce 
both output goods. Country 1, however, would be a net exporter of Y and country two 
would be a net exporter of Z. Under conditions of free trade, the prices of outputs would 
be equal across countries. Since derived demand would be identical in both countries, 
then the factor prices would also be the same and would equal the factors' marginal 
revenue product. The price of each of the four types of goods in country 1 would equal 
its price in countr;· 2. The prediction of the equality of input prices across countries 
in environment 2 will be referenced to as the factor price equalization principle. Notice 
that for the parameter values imposed in this environment, factor price equalization 1s 
predicted even though the factors cannot be traded internationally. 
4.2 Autarky 
A natural alternative model to use is the autarky model. It is useful because it character­
izes one benchmark of the potential behavior which a system might exhibit. Its predic­
tions are based upon the proposition that no trade will occur across national boundaries. 
This model predicts the prices and production levels in each country which would occur 
in a competitive equilibrium with no international transactions permitted. This model 
thus offers specific predictions of prices, patterns of production, international trade, and 
14 
the effects of tariffs. 
For environment 1, the autarkic model predicts that specialization would not occur 
in either country, and that there would be no international trade or payment imbalances. 
Since there is no trade across national boundaries, the predictions of this model are 
unaffected by the imposition of tariffs. According to the autarky model, prices of all 
goods would be different in the two countries. 
The autarkic model also makes predictions concerning production and trade in the two 
countries in environment 2. Both countries produce both goods but in different quantities 
than in the competitive equilibrium. Autarky predicts that there will be no international 
trade and that both input and output prices will be different across countries. The wage 
price ratio predictions are identical to those predicted by the competitive model. There 
should be no payment imbalances. The predictions of the autarky model are computed 
in a similar way to the competitive model. The computations are available from the 
authors. 
The specific predictions of the two models in the two environments are given in 
table 4. An illustration of the auta.rky and of the competitive models is given in Figure
1 from an individual's point of view. In the figure, if trade between countries does not 
occur, an individual in country 1 achieves his highest indifference curve given initial 
endowments, by consuming 5.25 units of Y and 1.25 units of Z. Similarly, an individual
in country 2 reaches his highest possible utility level by consuming 1.25 units of Y and
5.5 units of Z. In the experimental environment, money, which has value to all agents, 
15 
TABLE 4: SPECIFIC PREDICTIONS OF THE TWO MODELS: 
PRODUCTION AND EXPORT QUANTITIES AND PRIC ES IN 
FRANCS WITHOUT TARIFFS AND (WITH TARIFFS) 
ENVIRONMENT I ENVIRONMENT 2 
Competitive Autarky Competitive Autarky 
PRODUCTION 
Y1 36 (36) 21 (21) 12 IO 
Y2 0 (OJ 5 (5) 4 6 
z, 0 (OJ 5 {5) 4 6 
Z2 32 (32) 22 (22) 12 10 
EXPORTS 
Y1 18 (18) 0 (0) 4 0 
Y2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 0 
Net Y (from I to 2) 18 (18) 0 (0) 4 0 
z, 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 0 
Z2 16 (6) 0 (O) 4 0 
Net Z (from 2 to I) 16 (6) 0 (0) 4 0 
PRiCES 
L1 720 (720J 600 (600) 200-250 150 
L2 760 (360J 520 (520) 200-250 300-350 
K1 - 200-250 300-350 
K2 200-250 150 
Y1 240 (240) 200 (200) 200-225 150 
Y2 520 {520) 200-225 300-350 
z, - 600 (600) 200-225 300-350 
Z2 380 (180) 260 (260) 200-225 150 
16 
y 
y 
Fig. 1 
Continuous Approximation of Representative Consumer's 
Indifference Curve and Relative Prices Under Autarky and 
Free Trade 15 
12 
15 
12 
Country 1 
8 
z 
Country 2 
8 
z 
17 
10 
10 
C: Competitive Allocation 
A: Autarky Allocation 
12 14 16 
12 14 16 
may be borrowed costlessly in large quantities from the experimenter. For this reason, 
there is no budget constraint. The optimal consumption bundle is determined by the 
prices of Y and Z and by the consumer's utility for Y, Z and money. The autarky 
consumption bundles of individual consumers in the two countries are labelled with A's 
i n  the figure. If free trade occurs, then each country can achieve a higher utility level by 
specializing in the commodity in which it has a comparative advantage and then trade 
i nternationally at the world competitive equilibrium price. The competitive equilibrium 
individual consumption bundles are labelled with C's. In the competitive equilibrium, 
each country consumes 18 units of Y and 16 units of Z. 
5 Results 
In making the statistical inferences below, we implicitly assume that each market period 
is an independent observation. Although the periods are not independent, the statistics 
are useful in describing some of the phenomena we observe in the data6 
6We use both the Sign test and the \Vilcoxon rank sum test. The sign test is a procedure for testing 
hypotheses about the median of a continuous distribution. If X denotes the random variable whose 
distribution is under investigation, then P(X ::; µ) = P(X � µ} = .5. The general null hypothesis has 
the form Ho : µ = µo. 
Whenµ= 01 any Xi is equally likely to be positive or negative. If, however, the true value ofµ is 
much greater than 0, we would expect most of the observed Xi's to be positive. Define the test statistic 
Y =the number of Xi's such that X1 > 0. For testing Ho, versus Ha:µ> 0, the sign test rejects Ho 
when the test.statistic Y � c. If we regard each .Y, as n trial, and the data consist of a set of n identical 
trials, and if we define a positive Xi to be a success and a non·positive Xi as a failure, then we have p 
= P(success) = P(X; > 0) = P(X; > µ) = .5. Then, when Ho is true, the statistic Y has a binomial 
distribution with parameters n and p (p = .5). Therefore, if the null hypothesis is Ho:µ= 0 and the 
alternative hypothesis is Ha : Jl 'f; 0, then we reject Ho if either Y 2: c or Y ::;: (n - c). When p = .5 
and n ?: 10 the binomial distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution. For most of our 
statistical tests, Xi equals the observed value of a variable for a market period minus a theoretically 
predicted value of the variable. If we reject the hypothesis that µ = 0, than we reject the hypothesis 
18 
The principal observations are summarized in Result 0 thru Result 8. A typical set of
price time series from environment 1 is represented in Figures 2 and 3. The input prices
for each country separately are in the Figure 2 graphs. The output prices are pooled 
across countries for each of the two outputs and are given in the two graphs of Figure 3. 
The horizontal lines are the competitive equilibrium prices. 
Notice from the figure, that the transaction prices seem to be moving toward the 
competitive equilibrium prices over time. While this tendency of convergence will ul-
timately be shown to be true, the first pa.ss at the data holds to strict standards. As 
can be seen the prices are not at the competitive equilibrium. As we indicated earlier, 
in an economic system as complicated as these, it is very easy to statistically reject the 
benchmark models. This indeed proved true. 
Result 0: Both the competitive and the autarky models can be statistically 
rejected. 
Support: The world production predictions of the autarky model are rejected for 
both goods in the conditions of environment 1. That is, the hypothesis that the median 
world production is less than or equal to the a.uta.rky level is rejected at the (p < .05) level
for both output goods in both tariff and no tariff conditions. Similarly, the competitive 
that the median of the observed values of the variable equals the theoretical prediction. 
The Wilcoxon Rank·Sum test is a procedure which has the desired level of significance for a very 
large class of underlying distributions. Under the assumption that two independent random samples, 
are drawn from continuous distributions with the same shape and spread, the Rank Sum statistic tests 
whether the means of the two distributions are equal. We use the rank sum test when we consider 
whether the mean value of a variable is different in the early vs. late periods of an experiment, or 
different in the tariff vs. no tan ff conditions. See Devore ( 1982) or another introductory statistics text 
for a description and derivation of the sign and t.he rank sum tests. 
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Figure 2: Input Price Thne Series, Experiment 041391A, 
Country 1 (Upper Graph) and Country 2 (Lower Graph) 
5487 
2365 3145 3926 4706 5487 
20 
6'1h1 
6'M7 
Figure 3: Output Price Time Series, Experirnent 041391A, 
Prices of Y In Both Countries (Upper Grnph) and 
Prices of Z in Both Countries (Lower Graph) 
2365 3145 3926 4706 5487 6'1h1 
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Clock(oec) 
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Clock(oec) 
7048 7828 8609 
Cloclc(sec) 
model can be rejected. That is, the hypothesis that world production is greater than or 
equal to the predictions of the competitive model is rejected for Y in both conditions 
and for Z under tariff conditions (but not in the no tariff condition) at (p < .05). In
all three treatments, and in almost all markets, we reject hypotheses that the median 
observed export levels equal the predictions of both of the models at the (p < .05) level. 
For environment 1, we reject the predicted prices of both models for almost all markets, 
(there are two exceptions out of 16 markets) at the (p < .10) level. For environment 
2, we reject both models as predictors of prices in all output markets and the autarky 
model as a predictor of prices in all input markets at the (p < .05) level. For the exact 
levels at which predictions of the models are rejected please refer to Appendix B, Tables 
Bl and B2. For avt:rages of prices in all markets, net exports and production see Tables 
B3 thru B20. D 
It is not surprising that the models are statistically rejected. However, more impor­
tantly, one of the models (the competitive model) does describe the qualitative features 
of the data quite well as the following series of results will show. Result 1 summarizes 
observations concerning whether or not the law of comparative advantage can be seen 
in operation. The notion is that countries produce more of and export the output in 
whose production they have a comparative advantage. Recall that the law of compara­
tive advantage holds that country 1 should specialize in and be a net exporter of good 
Y. Country 2 should specialize in and be a net exporter of Z. 
22 
Result 1: The law of comparative advantage accurately predicts trade pat­
terns. 
Support: In every period of every experimental session, in environment 1 and in 87% 
of all periods in environment 2, net exports of both outputs are in the direction predicted 
by the competitive model. Average net exports by country 1 of Y are ll.5 units per period 
in environment 1 without tariffs, 8.3 with tariffs and 2.2 in environment 2. Average net 
exports of Z by country 2 are 10.3 in environment 1 without tariffs, 2.8 under tariffs and 
2.7 in environment 2. The sign test leads us to reject the null hypothesis that either the 
net exports of Y from country 1 to country 2 are less than zero or that net exports of Z 
from country 2 to country 1 are less than zero. (The z-scores for the three treatments 
are respectively 6.32, 5.47 and 4.74 and the p-values are less than .001 in all treatments. )  
Country 1 i s  clearly exporting more Y than i t  imports. Country 2 i s  exporting more Z 
than it imports. D 
Of course, the law of comparative advantage can be viewed as an independent principle 
or it can be viewed as a consequence following from the assumptions of the general 
competitive model. Thus, since the result lends support to the competitive model, it is 
natural to inquire about other features of the model. The competitive model not only 
predicts the direction of net exports. as captured by the law of comparative advantage 
as discussed in Result 1, it also predicts patterns of production. For environment 1 the 
competitive model predicts that no units of Y would be produced in country 1 and that 
no units of Z would be produced in country 2. Result 2 reflects considerations of those 
precise implications of the competitive model under both tariff and no tariff conditions. 
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The support for Result 2 can be seen in Figures 4 and 5 for environment l. The 
figures contain world aggregate production for early periods and for later periods. The 
world production frontier is shown in the figure. The competitive model predicts that 
world production will be at the "kink" in the frontier. Figure 4 contains data from 
environment 1 experiments in which there were no tariffs. Figure 5 contains the data 
from environment 1 experiments in which tariffs existed. As can be seen in both figures,
aggregate production is nearer the competitive equilibrium in the later periods. 
Result 2: Aggregate production patterns are converging toward those pre-
dieted by the competitive model. 
Support: The degree of support for the proposition varies with the experimental 
conditions. Support is strongest for environment l. Under free trade (no tariffs) produc-
ti on is ceasing where it should cease. A Ye rage production of Y by country 2 was 3.3 in
periods 1 thru 4 and 0.8 in periods 5 thru 11, (the competitive equilibrium is 0 units. ) 
Average production of Zin country 1 was 3.1 units in the first four periods and 1.3 in the 
later periods (competitive equilibrium is 0.) A rank sum test comparing the production
of Y in country 2 in the early vs late periods can be used to reject the hypothesis that 
the production quantity is increasing (z-score = 1.81, p-value < .05 and similarly the 
production of Zin country 1 does not increase with time (z-score = 1.29, p-value < .!). 
Production is also taking place in the locations and approaching the quantities predicted 
by the competitive model. Production of Y in country I and Z in country 2 is at the 
respective average level of 31.5 and :30.'J i11 late periods. The competitive equilibrium
levels are 36 and 32 respectively. 
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In environment 1 under tariffs production is ceasing where it should but not so. rapidly. 
Average production of Y in country 2 is 5.8 units in the early periods and 4.0 in the later 
(the hypothesis that the quantity is increasing is rejected, z-value = 2.99, p-value < .01.) 
Production of Z in country 1 is 2. 7 in both the early and late periods so the hypothesis of 
convergence to the zero levels predicted cannot be supported. Similarly, production takes 
place where it should take place and country 2 production of Z is increasing. However, 
country 1 production of Y is not increasing. 
In environment 2 the support for the result is the weakest. Production of Y is going 
up in country 1 (from an average of 8.9 in early periods to 10.9 later, as compared to the 
12 predicted by the competitive model) and it is going down in country 2 (from 6 to 4.2 
as compared to the competitive equilibrium of 4.) However, relative production of Z is as 
quantitatively predicted but the magnitudes are off and the data shows no movement. D 
Result 2 is focused on production. The next result, Result 3, considers consumption 
patterns. Do individual consumption levels converge with replication of periods to the 
predictions of the competitive model? 
Result 3: Individual consumption patterns are converging to those predicted 
by the competitive model 
Support: The deviation in individual consumption from the quantities predicted in 
the competitive are diminishing over time (see Table 5). In the table the data are pooled 
for all of the experimental se••ions. From the table, it is evident that the absolute value 
of the deviations are smaller in the later periods than in the earlier periods. For example, 
27 
TABLE 5: DEVIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS' HOLDING FROM 
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM PREDI CTIONS (BY PERIOD) 
PERIOD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
y µ -0.91 -0.46 -0.58 -0.45 -0.46 -0.40 -0.24 -0.18 
OUTPUT " 1.63 1.49 1.29 1.38 1.09 1.11 0.91 0.98 
z µ -0.95 -0.79 -0.60 -0.40 -0.30 -0.31 -0.21 -0.23 
" 1.84 1.64 1.15 1.55 1.25 1.26 1.06 1.07 
µ = L(:z:; - zi)/N 
"= [L(z; - :z:i)2 /N]-l 
Where Xi actual holdings of agent i 
x: competitive equilibrium holdings of agent i 
N total number of observations (consumers times experiments) 
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9 
-0.28 
1.05 
-0.39 
1.16 
the mean deviations from the competitive equilibrium fall consistently over the first four 
periods for both Y and Z .  Similarly the standard deviations during the first periods are 
higher than those in the last periods. The hypothesis that the absolute value of the 
deviations for periods 1 thru 3 are smaller than or equal to those for periods 7 thru 11
can be rejected at p < .01. D 
The addition of tariffs on imports of country 1 changes the predictions of the compet-
itive model. According to the model, the tariff discourages the export of Z by country 
2 and encourages the home consumption of Z by country 2. Figure 6 demonstrates the 
differences in consumption patterns in environment 1 that were caused by the tariff. The 
figure shows aggregate consumption for each country with the top panel containing data 
from country 1 and the bottom, data from country 2. The production possibilities curve 
is shown for each country as a point of reference. Note that the consumption of Z 1s 
shifted from country 1 to country 2 with the imposition of the tariff. 
The change in consumption that is apparent in the figure reflects a deep interaction 
between principles of economics and the parameters of these economies. The tariff, 400 
francs per unit of Z imported by country 1, is not so high as to prevent specialization 
in both countries in the same levels of output as they would specialize under free trade 
according to the competitive model. That is. the world patterns of production should not
be altered by the tariff in this version of the Ricardian model. However, the competitive 
model predicts that the reduction in exports of Z would lead to lower system efficiency7. 
7System efficiency is measured as actual social income (in francs) divided by social income at the 
competitive equilibrium. See Plott and Smith ( 1978) for a discussion of the concept in a single market 
economy. In a multiple market economy the measure can be influenced by scale Choices. 
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The impact of the tariff is to block some gains from international exchange. System 
efficiency thus falls due to the imposition of a tariff. This property is captured by the 
next result. Generally, we find that the tariff affects trade volume, efficiency and prices 
in the way that the competitive model predicts. 
Result 4: Tariffs reduce international trade and market efficiency, as predicted 
by the competitive model. Prices also differ in the manner predicted by the 
competitive model. 
Support: The relevant data is for environment 1. Average net exports per period 
are 10.3 without the tariffs and 2.8 under tariffs. We reject the hypothesis at the p < .01
level that exports of Z are lower or equal under free trade than under tariffs. Refer again 
to Figure 6 which depicts consumption in the two countries in all experiments in the 
condition of environment 1 with and without tariffs. Market efficiency under tariffs is
compared to that without tariffs for the pooled environment 1 data in Figure 7. As can 
be seen for each period average efficiency under the no tariff condition is higher than 
average efficiency of the tariff condition.We reject the hypothesis that efficiency is equal 
in the two conditions or higher under tariffs (p < .05). We also reject the hypothesis, 
using the rank sum test, that the prices of L2 or the prices of Z2 are equal under the
tariff and in the absence of the tariff. The average prices of L2 and Z2 are 550 and 467,
respectively under no tariff conditions and are respectively 402 and 380 under tariffs. As 
the competitive model predicts, they are both lower in the tariff case. D 
The comparative statics of the tariff summarized by Result 4 are interesting because 
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they compare disequilibrium states with and without the tariff and not the equilibrium 
states as assumed by theory. The next results move on to consider the nature and degree 
of this disequilibrium behavior with a focus on prices. Average price data are contained in 
Table 6. As is stated in the results, the output prices are moving toward the competitive 
equilibrium. 
Result 5: Output prices are converging toward the competitive equilibrium 
price from above. 
Support: The time trend of average prices toward the competitive equilibria (in 
parenthesis) establishes the result. In periods 1 thru 4, average (competitive) prices of 
Y1 and Z2 were 419 (240) and 508 (380) in environment 1 with no tariffs and in periods 
5 and greater they were 312 and 439 respectively. In environment 1 with tariffs during 
periods 1 thru 4 the Yi and Z2 prices were respectively, 418 (240) and 462 (180) and were 
348 and 348 in the later periods. In environment 2, in which all competitive equilibrium 
prices are the same at (200-22.5 ), the average prices in periods 1 thru 4 for Yi, Y2, Z1, 
Z2 were respectively 391, 381, 368 and :J4.5; and for periods five and greater the averages 
were 27 4, 287, 273, and 288. Using the rank sum test, we reject the hypothesis that 
average per period prices are further from the competitive equilibria in the later periods 
at the 5 percent level for all output markets. D 
While output prices move in an understandable way, as summarized by Result 5, 
input prices are more complex because of the nature of derived demand. The next result 
suggests that the deviation of factor prices from the competitive equilibrium is not only 
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due to a lack of equilibrium in the output price market but that factors have their own 
TABLE 6: AVERAGE PRI CES OF INPUT S  AND OUTPUT S independent dynamic structure of adjustment. However, the direction of adjustment in 
EARLY PERI OD S AND LATE PERI ODS 
the factor markets is toward the equilibria of the competitive model. 
Environment 1 (No Tariffs) 
Periods L1 L, y, Y, z, z, 
1-4 603 503 419 476 535 508 
Result 6: Factor prices are below marginal revenue products. That is, the 
5 and greater 678 600 312 456 530 439 
Competive Equilibrium 720 760 240 380 input/output price ratio is below the marginal product. The convergence is 
Autarky 600 520 200 520 600 260 
in the direction of the competitive equilibrium relationships. 
Environment 1 (Tariffs) 
Periods L1 L, Y, Y, z, z, 
1-4 543 287 418 417 472 462 
5 and greater 662 477 348 328 591 348 
Support: The conditions for profit maximization under competitive conditions is 
Competive Equilibrium 720 360 240 - 180 
Autarky 600 520 200 520 600 260 simply that factor price= ma.rginal physical product times output price. Since production 
Environment 2 
Periods L, L, K1 K2 Y, y, z, z, 
technologies are linear, the marginal physical product is a constant. It follows that the 
1-4 2o� 295 273 257 391 381 368 348 
5 and greater 240 256 228 238 274 287 273 288 ratio of factor price to output price when compared to marginal products can then be 
Competive Equilibrium [220-250] [200-250] [200-250] [200-250] [200-225] [200-225] [200-225] [200-225] 
Autarky 150 (300-350] [300-350] 150 150 [300-350] [300-350] 150 used to determine whether the input demand conditions are satisfied. 
Table 7 contains the average factor price to average output price ratios for fac-
tor/output pairs for which the factor is used in the production of the output. In all cases 
the factor price to output price ratio is below the marginal physical product (shown at 
bottom of table.) It follows that factor prices are below marginal revenue products in 
all cases. We can also reject the hypothesis that the factor price to output price ratio is 
higher in the early periods in all markets at the 5 percent level. 0 
Two possible reasonable explanations of the observed input/output price behaviors 
summarized in Result 6 are consistent with behaviors found in other experimental mar-
kets. The first is that the asymmetry of rents received by sellers an<l buyers of the factors 
(sellers receive more rents) leads to lower transaction prices because rents are split (see 
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Smith and Williams (1982). However, if this is the explanation then the factor prices 
should approach equilibrium from below. In all environments, as long as output prices 
are at or above the competitive equilibria prices, producer surplus is greater than con-
sumer surplus in the appropriate partial equilibrium model. As is evident in Table 6, 
factor prices in environment 2 do not approach the competitive equilibria from below. 
Since factor prices do not approach equilibria from below in environment 2 this first 
(rent splitting) explanation must be rejected. The other possible explanation is that 
the buyers of the factors face a market risk. The buyer may not able to sell the final 
goods produced with the factor. In the experiments producers must buy the input, 
then produce and sell the output. This takes time and the possibility that prices could 
change or the possibility that time could run out, create real risks for producers. As 
a compensation to the producer for bearing this risk, a "return for risk bearing," the 
factor/output price ratio starts low and adjusts upwards. Risk of this type might be 
a general property of interdependent markets and if it is then the input/output price 
adjustments observed in the experiments might also be observed in the field. Regardless 
of the interesting separate dynamics, the most fundamental theoretical property derived 
from the competitive equilibrium model still holds as is captured by Result 7. 
Result 7: Factor prices adjust across count ries (in environment 2) as p redicted 
by the factor p rice equalization principle. 
Support: In environment 2 competitive equilibrium output prices are all the same 
(200 - 250) and competitive equilibrium input prices are all the same (200 - 225.) We 
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cannot reject the hypothesis that the prices of any of the four types of goods are the 
same in the two countries. The z scores are .73, .36, 1 .09, and .36 for L, K ,  Y and Z 
respectively. None of these are significant at the 10 percent level. Per period average 
prices for the four inputs, L1 , L2, /(1, /(2 are respectively, 261 ,  272, 248 and 244. Outputs 
Y; ,  }2, Z1 and Z2 have average prices respectively, of 323, 324, 310, 312. D 
The equality of factor prices for our parameters in environment 2 is a theoretically 
sound result. Since the outputs trade internationally they must trade at the same price 
in the two countries. Therefore, because production technology is linear and identical in 
the two countries, the marginal revenue product of the inputs and therefore their wages 
should be the same even though the inputs themselves do not trade internationally. 
Interestingly, in our experiment, we observe equality of input prices across countries even 
though these input prices are not equal to the marginal revenue product of the inputs. 
Since profits can be viewed as a return to a special input (risk bearing,) the pattern 
of profits is worthy of special investig·ation. In the competitive model, equilibrium profits 
from production are zero. The next result demonstrates that the patterns of profits follow 
the laws suggested by the competitive model. 
Result 8: Profits from production are p ositive but fall over time. 
Support: For environment 1 we reject at the 5 percent level the hypothesis that total 
profits from production are greater in periods 5 than in periods 1 thru 4 or are equal in 
the early and late periods. An ambiguity in the concept of "profit" exists 
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for environment 2 and for all 8 person experiments. Under those conditions producers 
could also consume, so profit calculations can be performed only under some clearly stated 
convention. In order to conserve space we observe that the ratio of input prices to output 
prices falls over time. Under any reasonable definition of profits it must be the case that 
profits fall over time as well. D 
Finally, we make three observations. The first is a summary about the autarky 
model which is included for completeness. Observations 2 and 3 are different. Neither 
observation has particular foundation in theory. However, following the statement of the 
observations we provide a conjecture about the nature of the dynamics at work in these 
markets. If the conjecture is correct then the third observation can be explained. 
Observation 1: The competitive model explains the data better than the 
autarky model. 
Support: The support is contained in previously stated results. In Result 1 and 
Result 2 the production data from environment 1 reveals that the systems of production 
and export for all goods are moving toward the competitive equilibrium and away from 
autarky. The production data from environment 2 seems to clearly favor neither model. 
From Result 4, we see that tariffs ha.cl effects predicted by the competitive model while 
autarky predicted that tariffs would have no effects. Output prices are converging to 
the competitive equilibrium as opposed to the autarky levels (Result 5.) The only real 
exception is Z, under the tariff condition but here the volume was very low. The only
input prices that move toward autarky and away from the competitive equilibrium are 
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those for L2 under the tariff condition. D 
Observation 2: In the no tariff condition, a large amount of exporting going 
back and forth between the two countries was observed. The trading appeared 
to be international speculation and seemed to help markets converge. 
Support: Net exports constitute only 6:3.S percent of total international trade under 
free trade in environment 1 .  The rest of the volume comprised units which had been 
or were being returned to their country of origin. When tariffs were imposed the cross 
trading in Z was essentially eliminated. D 
Observations 3: Contrary to the prediction of the competitive model, the
tariff reduced production efficiency. 
Support: Figure S contains world production data for the last few periods of exper-
iments with tariffs and experiments without tariffs. These are periods after which some 
equilibration has taken place. Recall that in this version of the Ricardian model the tariff
should have no influence on production. As is clear from the figure, production was less
when the tariff existed. D 
A review of some of the results presented above provides surprisingly strong support 
for a conjecture about the nature of the dynamics at work in these markets. Collecting 
Results 5, 6, 7 and 8 along with Observat ion :3 reveals a pattern of the disequilibrium
dynamics. The system appears to be moving toward the competitive equilibria. along a 
qualitatively distinctive path. The term "conjecture" is used because the path cannot be 
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deduced from accepted theory even though it is supported by much theoretical intuition. 
An explanation of the dynamics, which we shall call the "risk compensated in­
put/output price adjustment process," begins with the observation that markets have 
an inherent randomness as part of the general equilibration process. This randomness 
creates a risk for producers who must commit to the purchase of resources and who face 
the possibility of losses if the product produced from the resources cannot be sold at 
sufficiently high prices. Accordingly, producers restrict purchase of resources and thus 
restrict production as they gather information about market conditions. The results are 
higher (than equilibrium) market prices in output markets clue to restricted supplies and 
lower (than equilibrium) input prices clue to restricted input demand. As the experience 
that producers gain from the market advances with the repetition and stationarity of pa­
rameters, the uncertainty diminishes (due to the accumulation of information about the 
market) and the randomness decreases (clue to equilibration. ) Output expands; output 
prices fall; and input prices rise. The results are an increasing input/output price ratio 
over time and falling profits. The conjecture that follows is simply that disequilibrium 
behavior is characterized by such a process. 
Conjecture: Equilibration in the experiments follows the risk compensated 
input/output price adjustment process. 
Support: All of the properties of the path, as described, are contained in the market 
data. Output prices converge toward the competitive equilibrium from above (Result 5 ) .  
Input prices converge toward the competitive equilibrium (Results 6 and 7 ) .  Producer's 
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profits fall over time (Result 8) as the input/output price ratio increases. 
The fact that input prices converge to the competitive equilibrium from below in 
environment 1 and converge from above in environment 2 is also consistent with the 
hypothesis. In environment 1 producers faced greater risks than in environment 2. In 
environment 2 producers were also consumers of factors so factors unused in produc­
tion were valuable to them as consumption. In environment 1 producers had no such 
alternatives so the "down side" losses to producers was greater in environment 1 than in
environment 2. The greater risk to producers in environment 1 would then be manifest 
in lower input prices. 
Observation 3 is also consistent with the hypothesis that the disequilibrium is char­
acterized by such a path. A tariff imposed on the imports of Z in country 1 (which has a 
comparative disadvantage in Z and thus consumes only imported in equilibrium) consti­
tutes a major perturbation of the system. The natural tendency is for the price of Z in
country 1 to be higher as a result of the tariffs. The risk compensated input/output price 
adjustment process exacerbates the increase of the price of Z in country 1 in the early
period of an experiment. With the price of' imported Z very high in country 1 due to the
combined effects, some Z gets produced in country 1. On the other hand, in country 2,
market demand for Z is reduced because there is reduced demand for exports. Thus, in 
country 2 the price of Z falls, making Z less profitable for country 2 producers relative
to the production of Y whose market supply is reduced because some of the resources 
in country 1 are diverted to the production of Z. Some Y gets produced in country 2.
Thus, along this disequilibrium path, country 1 ( inefficiently) shifts production from a 
4 3  
full specialization in the production of Y to include the production of some Z. Country
2 shifts from a complete specialization in the production of Z to (inefficiently) i nclude 
the production of some Y. The resulting inefficiencies are captured in the data from the 
experiments as summarized by Observation 3 and are shown in Figure 8. D 
Of course, there is nothing theoretically new about profits being a return to producers 
for bearing market uncertainty. The new and difficult (theoretical) challenge stems from 
the fact that markets seem to have a natural, but i nexplicable random component that is  
not captured by modern theory. The intuition that should support a theory seems clear 
but no formal statement of such a theory exists currently. The natural reaction of agents 
to the i nherent ra .. 1<lomness, would seem to be similar to any portfolio adjustment. The 
system adjustment to the individ ual hedging behavior appears natural enough. Since the 
path has such clearly distinguishable features it will be of interest to explore both other 
experiments as well as field data to see if system adjustments, along the risk compensated 
input/output price path, is found other places as well. And, it will be of interest to learn 
if the intuition captured by the explanation given above can be placed on solid theoretical 
footing. 
6 Conclusion 
The main result of the paper is that we observe experimentally for the first time, that the 
law of comparative advantage predicts patterns of trade and output. This result would 
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not have been completely unanticipated by trade theorists because it is so imbedded in 
modern economic models. However, the experiments, like naturally occurring economies, 
are complex, with mistakes, trading out of equilibrium, limitations on information, con­
siderable uncertainty about the future and other prominent features that are not present 
in existing stylized models. Furthermore, the recent debates on U.S. competitiveness 
suggest that many people outside the economics research community do not believe that 
the law of comparative advantage works and are prepared to base policy on much differ­
ent principles of system behavior. We find it remarkable that this fundamental principle 
operates with such strength and robustness even though the competitive model is statis­
tically rejected. Were it not found operating, we would be forced to re-examine one of 
the deepest aspects of modern theories of the nature of trade and the existence of that 
very real possibility was an important consideration in the research design. 
Generally, the qualitative predictions of the competitive model are upheld. Conver­
gence processes are present so the competitive model receives better support in the later 
periods after equilibration takes place. This convergence takes place more quickly and 
strongly for quantities than for prices. The support of the competitive model extends 
itself to the qualitative impacts of a tariff. Support of this nature is very interesting since 
comparative statics models generally assume that the system is moving from one estab­
lished equilibrium to another. In real markets, such as those studied here, disequilibria 
exist. There is  little support for the autarky model in these experiments. International 
trade occurs in a natural way and must be considered in the application of models to 
any of the interacting countries. 
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Factor price equalization is a remarkable and unintuitive property. While this prop-
erty is characteristic of only specialized environments it is important in helping us to see 
and understand that the principles of economics can lead to unintuitive and non-obvious 
results. That wages should equalize as a result of competition in output markets alone 
is such a proposition. Under the strong conditions i n  which theory suggests it will exist, 
we actually found it. 
There was, although it was diminishing over time, a universal tendency for the factors 
of production to trade at prices below their marginal revenue product. The most plausible 
explanation is that the output prices adjusted upward and the input prices adjusted 
downward to com!'ensate producers for the risk they undertook in producing the output. 
In later market periods, as output prices stabilized and the natural randomness that exists 
in markets tends to diminish, the producers' risk declined, input prices increased, output 
prices decreased, and producer profits fell. The process is well described by the term 
"risk compensated input/output price adjustment process." This somewhat surprising 
pattern is so plausible in retrospect tha.t it lea.els to a. speculation about whether it may 
be a general property of production economies observable in the field, especially those
with extreme output price uncertainty, such as centrally planned systems in transition
to market economies. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Several different instructions were used during the course of these experiments. En­
vironments 1 and 2 differed because producers had redemption values for input goods 
in environment 2 but not in environment 1 .  There were also two input goods in en­
vironment 2 and only one input good in environment 1 .  The experiments with eight 
subjects had instructions that differed slightly from those with sixteen subjects. In the 
sixteen subject experiments a distinction was made between agent "type" (type 1 or type 
2) while no such distinction was made between agents in the eight person experiments 
because the activities (producer and consumer) were combined. Then, there were the 
experiments in which an import tax existed. In reviewing the material that follows, the 
reader should appreciate that each of these several instructions was generated by only 
a few word changes (e.g., and/or vs or). A single paragraph added to the instructions 
explained the tariff in those experiments in which a tariff was operative. 
The instructions hold two additional sources of potential ambiguity. The first is the 
labeling of markets. Three sets of labels exist throughout the series. For example, in the 
manuscript text of this paper the input from country 1 is labeled as L1 • However, in the 
instructions read to subjects, this input was called W and the trading activity of W took 
place in market 1 and is recorded that way in the data sets. Table Al lists all of the 
relationships. The word "paper" refers to the manuscript in front of this appendix; the 
word "instructions" refers to what subjects saw; and the word "data/markets" indicates 
the index as presented on computer screens during the experiment and in the data sets. 
TABLE Al: LABELS OF OUTPUT AND INPUT ACTIVITIES BY 
SOURCE: PAPER, INSTRUCTIONS, DATA SETS (MARKETS) 
Environment 1 Environment 2 
Paper Instructions Data (Market) Paper Instructions Data( Markets) 
Li w 1 Li Wi 1 
L2 x 2 L2 W2 2 
Yi Y1 3 Ki Y1 3 
Y2 Y2 4 K2 Y2 4 
Z1 Z1 5 Yi X1 5 
Z2 Z2 6 Y2 X2 6 
Zi Zi 7 
Z2 Z2 8 
The second source of possible confusion is the assignments of subjects to agent types 
such as consumer/producer, etc. In sixteen person experiments there is no confusion. 
Subjects in country i control resources and/or consume and/or produce in country i. In 
the eight person sessions, the roles were different. The lack of subject numbers required 
functions of producer, consumer, and resource owner to be combined. Because of the 
small numbers an oligopoly problem presented itself. If the producers own resources 
in their own country then they could influence the activities of their competition by 
refusing to sell him/her the resources. In order to avoid this complicating factor firms 
were producers/ consumers in one country but owned resources in the other country. 
Thus, producers/consumers in country i were resource owners in country j. Of course 
resource owners still could not transport the resources from one country to another. 
Three sets of instructions follow. The first set is for the 8 person, environment 1 ,  
and the second i s  for the 16 person, environment 1 .  The third set i s  for the 16 person 
environment 2. The forms for the Redemption Value Sheets (for Consumption Decisions) 
were the same for all treatments as were the accounting forms. Blank examples of both 
are included at the end of the instructions. Of course, the redemption value sheets are 
filled in by the experimenter and the accounting sheets by the subject. 
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The insuuctions are simple, 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash. 
Jn your folder you have a sheet entitled Record Sheet for each period, and a sheet entitled 
Redemption Value Sheet for each period. You will also have a Production Schedule. These sheets will 
help you determine the value to you of any decisions that you might make. YOU ARE NOT TO 
REVEAL THE INFORMATION ON THESE SHEETS TO ANYONE. They are your own private infor-
mation. 
The currency used in this market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. Your final 
payoff will be in terms of dollars. The conversion rate is __ francs to I U.S. dollar. You will be paid 
at the end of the experiment. 
There are four types of goods which will be traded in seperate markets: W, X, Y and Z. You may 
make profits in two ways, through consumption and through trading of the four goods. 
CONSUMPTION 
During each period you are free to purchase and sell as many units of W, X, Y and Z as you 
might want. Any units that you hold in your inventory at the end of the period are considered to be 
consumed by you. For the first unit of Y that you consume during a trading period you will receive the 
amount listed on your Redemption Value Sheet the column labelled Y Unit Value in the !st row. If you 
consume a second unit you receive the amount listed in the column labelled Y Unit Value in the second 
row. The total amount that you receive from the consumption of both units is found in the column 
labelled Y Total Value in the second row. Notice that if you have unit values of zero in a space or a 
column that the corresponding units are worthless to you. The amount you receive from consumption 
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of Z is found in exactly the same way. The redemption value received from consumption of W and X is 
always zero. 
TRADING PROFITS 
Another source of profits is from buying and selling the four types of goods. Selling increases your 
cash on hand by the amount of the sale price. Buying reduces your cash on hand by the amount of the 
purchase. Thus you can either gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of units. 
PRODUCTION 
During each market period you are free to produce units of Y and Z from units of W and X. This 
is done with the Transfonnation Key (F4). When producing units of Y and/or Z from units of W or X 
use the Ulble labelled Production Schedule. This uible reflects the number of units of Y and/or Z that 
you can produce from given amounts of W or X for the whole period. You have already been instructed 
in how to read the production schedule but the following hypothetical example may provide further 
clarification. 
Example: Suppose that you have 2 units of X and you have the Production Schedule shown on 
the next page. You can produce either: 
a)8 units of Y 
b)5 units of Y and 5 units of Z 
c)8 units of Z 
EARNINGS 
Your profits each period are computed by Ulking the redemption values of the units of W, X, Y and Z 
that you consumed that period, adding the total sale price of the units of that you sold during the period 
and then subtracting the total of the prices you paid for the units that you bought during the period. The 
profits that you make exactly equal the change in your cash on hand from the beginning to the end of 
the period plus the redemption values of the units you consume. 
Production Schedule 
Units or ';( 0 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
. ( Input ) 
Unit Output 0 s 3 1 0 0 0 0 ( Y )  
Total Output 0 s 8 9 9 9 9 9 
( y )  
Units or X 0 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
( Input ) 
Unit Output 0 s 3 1 0 0 0 0 ( Z )  
Total Output 0 5 8 9 9 9 9 9 
( Z ) 
8 
0 
9 
8 
0 
9 
(Each Period) 
Identificaf 
9 10 11 
0 0 0 
9 9 9 
9 10 11 
0 0 0 
9 9 9 
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Al the end of the period enter the LOLal 
number of uniLS that you consume of W,
 X. Y and Z at 
N 
1: 
the Lop of your Record Sheet. Then, 
fill out the rest of your record sheet as follo
ws. In line 2, fill in 
your Cash on Hand al the beginning o
f the period. In line 1, fill in your cash
 on hand at the end of the 
period. In line 3 fill in line I minus line 2. In 
lines 4-7 fill in your earnings from the
 consumption of 
W, X, Y, and Z. In line 8 add the total of li
nes 4-7. In line 9 add the total of lines 3 and
 8. This 
amount is equal to your proliLS for the period
 (in francs). 
0 
ENDOWMENTS 
9 
I) Al the beginning of each period you will b
e given an endowment of either W o
r X. This 
endowment will appear in your invent
ory and will remain the same every per
iod. You are free to sell 
any pan of this endowmenl to anyone w
ho might want Lo buy iL 
2) Al the beginning of the experiment yo
u will receive 100000 francs cash on hand
. 
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 
12 
Participanls are endowed wilh either W 
or X but would like to consume either 
Y or Z. They can sell 
W and X LO increase their cash in order to 
buy Y and z. They can also use W or X LO
 produce Y and 
Z, which they can sell to increase their cash. 
MARKET RESTRICTIONS 
0 
Some of you may nm be able LO trade in all 
markeLS. The experimenter will inform yo
u of which mark-
elS are closed to you. Unless you are inform
ed oLherwise Lhese markelS will be close
d LO you for the 
entire experiment. 
9 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are simple, 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a market in which you will be designated as one of 
two types of traders in a sequence of trading periods (either a type I or a type 2). Find your type at the 
top of the instructions. In your folder you have a sheet entitled Record Sheet If you are a type I, you 
will also have a Redemption Value Sheet If you are a type 2 you will have a Production Schedule. 
These sheets will help you determine the value to you of any decisions that you might make. YOU 
ARE NOT TO REVEAL THE INFORMATION ON THESE SHEETS TO ANYONE. They are your 
own private information. 
The currency used in this market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. Your final 
payoff will be in terms of dollars. The conversion rate is __ francs to I U.S. dollar. You will be paid 
at the end of the experiment. 
There are four types of goods which can be traded in our market: W, X, Y and Z. You may make 
profits in two ways, through consumption and through trading of the four goods. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO TYPE 1 TRADERS 
CONSUMPTION 
During each period you are free to purchase and sell as many units of W, X. Y and Z as you 
might want. Any units that you hold in your inventory at the end of the period are considered to be 
consumed by you. For the first unit of Y that you consume during a trading period you will receive the 
amount listed on your Redemption Value Sheet the column labelled Y Unit Value in the 1st row. If you 
consume a second unit you receive the amount listed in the column labelled Y Unit Value in the second 
row. The total amount that you receive from the consumption of both units is found in the column 
labelled Y Total Value in the second row. Notice that if you have unit values of zero in a space or a 
column that the corresponding units are worthless to you. The amount you receive from consumption 
of Z is found in exactly the same way. The redemption value received from consumption of W and X is 
always zero. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO TYPE 2 TRADERS 
PRODUCTION 
During each market period type two traders are free to produce units of Y and Z from units of W 
and X. This is done with the Transformation Key (F4). When producing units of Y and/or Z from units 
of W and X use the table labelled Production Schedule. This table reflects the number of units of Y 
and/or Z that you can produce from given amounts of W and X for the whole period. You have already 
been instructed in how to read the production schedule but the following hypothetical example may pro­
vide further clarification. 
Example: Suppose that you have 2 units of X and you have the Production Schedule shown on 
the next page. You can produce either: 
a) 8 units of Y 
b) 5 units of Y and 5 units of Z 
c) 8 units of Z 
INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH TYPES 
TRADING PROFITS 
Another source of profits is from buying and selling the four types of goods. Selling increases your 
cash on hand by the amount of the sale price. Buying reduces your cash on hand by the amount of the 
purchase. Thus you can either gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of units. 
Production Schedule 
Units or '>( 0 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
( Input ) 
Unit Output 0 s 3 1 0 0 0 0 ( Y )  
Total Output 0 s 8 9 9 9 9 9 
( y )  
Units or X 0 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 
( Input ) 
Unit Output 0 s 3 1 0 0 0 0 ( Z) 
Total Output 0 s 8 9 9 9 9 9 
( Z ) 
8 
0 
9 
8 
0 
9 
(Each Period) 
Identifi 
9 10 11 
0 0 0 
9 9 9 
9 IO 11 
0 0 0 
9 9 9 
I: 
0 
9 
12 
0 
9 
. 3 .  
EARNINGS 
Your profits each period are computed by 
talcing the redemption values of the units o
f W, X. Y and Z 
that you consumed that period, adding th
e total sale price of the units of !hat you so
ld during the period 
and !hen subtracting the total of the prices
 you paid for the units !hat you bought duri
ng the period. The 
profits !hat you make exactly equal !he 
change in your cash on hand from the be
ginning to the end of 
the period plus the redemption values of
 the units you consume. 
At the end of the period enter the total number of
 units !hat you consume of W, X. Y and Z 
at 
the top of your Record Sheet. Then, fill 
out the rest of your record sheet as follows. 
In line 2, fill in 
your Cash on Hand at !he beginning of !he
 period. In line I, fill in your cash on hand at the en
d of the 
period. In line 3 fill in line I minus line 2. In line
s 4-7 fill in your earnings from the consumption
 of 
W. X. Y, and Z. In line 8 add the total o
f lines 4-7. In line 9 add the total of lines 3 and 8
. This 
amount is equal to your profits for the period (in
 francs). 
ENDOWMENTS 
I) At the beginning of each period you will be give
n an endowment of either W or X. This 
endowment will appear in your inventory 
and will remain the same every period. You
 are free to sell 
any pan of this endowment to anyone who m
ight want to buy it 
2) At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 
I 00000 francs cash on hand. 
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 
Type I people are endowed with W or X but would 
like to consume Y and Z. They can sell W 
or X 
to type 2 people to increase their cash in order to buy Y
 and Z. Type 2 people are endowed with W or 
X but may purchase additional units from typ
e I people. They can produce Y and Z from W or X an
d 
sell them to type I people to increase their cash. 
MARKET RESTRICTIONS 
Some of you may not be able to trade
 in all markets. You may not trade in 
markets 
- 4 -
-------- • Unless you are informed otherwise these markets will be closed to you for the 
entire experiment. 
You may be taxed for trading in market 6. The tax that you pay is _ francs for each unit that you 
buy or sell in that marlce� Unless you are informed otherwise. the taX will remain the same for the 
entire experiment. 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are simple, 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment, we are going to conduct a market in which you will be designated as one of 
two types of traders in a sequence of trading periods (either a type I or a type 2). Find your type at the 
top of the instructions. In your folder you have a sheet entitled Record Sheet and a sheet entitled 
Redemption Value Sheet. If you are a type 2 you will also have a Production Schedule. These sheets 
will help you determine the value to you of any decisions that you might make. YOU ARE NOT TO 
REVEAL THE INFORMATION ON THESE SHEETS TO ANYONE. They are your own private infor-
mation. 
The currency used in this market is francs. All trading will be in terms of francs. Your final 
payoff will be in terms of dollars. The conversion rate is __ francs to 1 U.S. dollar. You will be paid 
at the end of the experiment. 
There are four types of goods which can be traded in our market: W, X, Y and Z. You may make 
profits in two ways, through consumption and through trading of the four goods. 
CONSUMPTION 
During each period you are free to purchase and sell many units of W, X, Y and Z as you might 
want. Any units that you hold at the end of the period are considered to be consumed by you. For the 
first unit of W that you consume during a trading period you will receive the amount listed on the left 
side attached Redemption Value Sheet in row (1) marked first unit redemption value, in the column 
labelled W. If you consume a second unit you receive the amount listed in row (4) marked 2nd unit 
redemption value in the column labelled W. The amount you receive from consumption. of X, Y, and Z 
- 2 -
is computed in exactly the same way. If you are a type I you always have zero redemption values for 
units of W and Y. If you are a type 2 you always have zero redemption values for units of X and Z. 
TRADING PROFITS 
Another source of profits is from buying and selling the four types of goods. Selling increases your 
cash on hand by the amount of the sale price. Buying reduces your cash on hand by the amount of the 
purchase. Thus you can either gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of units. 
PRODUCTION 
During each market period type 2 participants are free to produce units of X and Z from units of 
W and Y by transforming them. When producing units of X and/or Z from units of W and Y use the 
sheet labelled Production Schedule. This table reflects the number of units of X and/or Z you get from 
given amounts of W and Y for the whole period. Notice that you need W to produce X and you need 
Y to produce Z. 
Example: Suppose that you have I unit of W and 2 uniL• of Y and you have the Production 
Schedule shown on the next page. You can produce I unit of X, or 2 units of Z. 
EARNINGS 
Your profits each period are computed by taking the redemption values of the units of W, X, Y and Z 
that you consumed that period, adding the total sale price of the units of that you sold during the period 
and then subtracting the total price you paid for the units that you bought during the period. The profits 
that you make exactly equal the change in your cash on hand from the beginning to the end of the 
period plus the redemption values of the redemption values of the units you consume. 
At the end of the period enter the total redemption value of all of the units that you consume of 
W, X, Y and Z at the bottom of your redemption value sheet. Then, fill out your record sheet as fol­
lows. In line 2, fill in your Cash on Hand at the beginning of the period. In line I ,  fill in your cash on 
hand at the end of the period. In line 3 fill in line I minus line 2. In lines 4-7 fill in your earnings from 
- 3 -
the consumption of W, X, Y. and Z. In line 8 add the total of lines 4-7. In line 9 add the total of lines 
3 and 8. This amount is equal to your profits for the period (in francs). 
ENDOWMENTS 
!)At the beginning of each period type I participants will be given an endowment of W and Y. 
This endowment will remain the same every period. You are free to sell any pan of this endowment to 
anyone who might want to buy iL 
2)At the beginning of the experiment all panicipants will receive 10000 francs cash on hand. 
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS 
Type I people are endowed with W and Y but would like to consume X and Z. They must sell W and 
Y to type 2 people who have the ability to produce X and Z from W and Y and then buy X and Z from 
them. Type 2 people would like to consume W and Y. They must buy them from type I people. 
MARKET RESTRICTIONS 
Some of you may not be able to trade in all markets. The experimenter will inform you of which mark­
ets are closed to you. These markets will be closed to you for the entire experiment. 
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Appendix B 
1 . 1  Significance Tests 
The two following tables contain the result of numerous statistical tests 
conducted on the data supporting result 0. In both tables, in the columns 
labelled Competitive (Comp. )  and Autarky (Aut. )  are the levels of confi­
dence with which we reject the predictions of the models for the variables 
listed the leftmost column. The averages for all of the variables in the tables 
for all experiments are given in tables B4 - B20. 
TABLE Bl: SIGNIFICANCE OF STATISTICAL TESTS OF 
THE TWO MODELS (NO TARIFFS) 
ENVIR O NMENT 1 ENVIRONMENT 2 
Comp. Aut. Comp. Aut. 
P RO D UCTION 
y 0.001 0.001 not.sig. not.sig. 
z not.sig. 0.001 not.sig. not.sig. 
EXPORTS 
Net Y (from 1 to 2)  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Net Z ( from 2 to 1 )  0.01 0.001 0.001 0.001 
PRICES 
Ll 0.01  0 .1  not.sig. 0.001 
L2 0.001 0.01 not.sig. 0.001 
K l  not.sig. 0.001 
K2 not.sig. 0.001 
Yl 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Y2 0.01 0.001 
Zl 0 .0.5 0.001 
Z2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
In the second table, in the column labelled "Same as Notar" are the lev­
els of confidence with which we reject that the observed values of a variable 
are equal under tariffs and no tariffs. 
TABLE B2: SIGNIFICANCE OF STATISTICAL TESTS OF 
THE TWO MODELS (UNDER TARIFFS) 
ENVIRONMENT 1 
Comp. Aut. Same as N otar 
PRODUCTION 
y O.Dl 0.01 
z 0.001 o.o.s 
EXPORTS 
Net Y ( from 1 to 2 )  0.001 0.001 
Net Z ( from 2 to 1 ) 0.001 not.sig. 
PRICES 
Ll  0.05 not.sig. 
L2 not.sig. O.Dl 0.0.5 
Yl 0.001 0.001 
Y2 0 . 1  
Zl  0.0.S 
Z2 0.001 0.01  0.05 
1 . 2  Average Production and Exports 
The following 9 tables summarize the <la.ta on the levels of production and 
exports observed in each of the experiments. The data are given for the 
entire experiment as well as for the early and late periods separately. Tables 
B3-B.S encompass the four experiments in the conditions of environment one 
with no tariffs. Each table reports averages for each experimental session; 
Table B3 pools the data from the entire experiment, and B4 and B .S  report 
the data from periods 1-4 and periods 5 and greater respectively. In the 
t able "net exports of "Y refers to the net transfer of Y from country 1 to 
country 2. "Net exports of Z" refers the net transfer of Z from country 2 to 
country 1 .  
2 
TABLE B3:  PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 1 :  NO TARIFFS: ALL PERIODS 
Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
03/0.5/91 04/01/91 04/ 1 1 /9 1  04/ 1 3 / 9 1 A  
Prod. o f  Y l  27.I 30 26.3 3 1 .5 36 21 
Prod. of Y2 1 .45 3.1 1.6 1 . 1  0 5 
Prod. of Zl 1 .82 2 3 . 1  1 .4 0 5 
Prod. of Z2 28.9 25.8 28.9 29.8 32 22 
Net Exp. of Y 9.6 10.9 9.9 1 6 . l  18 0 
Net Exp. of Z 12.2 10.6 7 1 1  16 0 
TABLE B4: PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 1 :  NO TARIFFS :  PERIODS 1-4 
Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
03/05/91 04/01/91 04/ 1 1 /91 04/13/91A 
Prod. of Y l  22.5 27 20 29.3 36 21 
Prod. of Y2 3.8 4.8 2.8 2 0 5 
Prod. of Zl 3 3 4.5 2 0 5 
Prod. of Z2 24 22 .. 5 26 .. 5 28 36 22 
Net Exp. of Y 5 6.3 U.i 15 18 0 
Net Exp. of Z 9 . . 5 7 . .5 6 1 1  16 0 
TABLE B 5 :  PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 1: NO TARIFFS :  PERIODS 5 AND GREATER 
03/0.5/91 
Prod. of Y l :J J . 5  
Prod. o f  Y 2  0 . 1 
Prod. of Zl 1 .1  
Prod.  of Z2 :J J . '  
N e t  Exp. o f  Y 12.:3 
Net Exp. of Z J:3 . ;  
Experiment Number Comp. Ant 
04/01/91 04/ 1 1 /91 04/ 1 3 / 9 1 A  
:32 29.6 33 36 21 
2 0.6 0.5 0 5 
1.3 2 1 0 5 
28 :J0.8 3 1  36 22 
13.2 13.4 17 18 0 
12.i  7.8 1 1  16 0 
3 
Tables B6-B8 summarize the observed levels of production and exports 
in the tariff condition. Table B6 contains data from entire experiments. ta­
bles B 7  and BS contain only data from early and late periods respectively. 
TABLE B6: PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 1 :  TARRIFS: ALL PERIODS 
Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
03/20/91 04 / 1 0/91 04/ 1 3 / 9 1 B  
Prod. o f  Y l  30.4 33 18.9 36 2 1  
Prod. o f  Y 2  2.2 5.1 7.1 0 5 
Prod. of Z l  1 . 8  .9 5.4 0 ,5 
Prod. of Z2 26.9 20.5 17.5 32 22 
Net Exports of Y 1 1  1 0  4 . 4  18 0 
Net Exports of Z l . i  6.3 0.7 6 0 
TABLE B7: PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 1: TARRIFS: PERIODS 1-4 
Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
03/20/91 04/10/91 04 /13/91B 
Prod. of Yl 29.3 33.3 21 36 2 1  
Prod. o f  Y 2  2.8 ; 7.5 0 5 
Prod. of Zl 2.3 .8 5.0 0 5 
Prod. of Z2 2.5.3 1 .5  16.3 32 22 
Net Exports of Y 5.5  i.O 4.2 1 8  0 
Net Exports of Z J .(j 2 0.3 6 0 
TABLE BB: PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 1 :  TARRIFS: PERIODS 5 AND GREATER 
Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
03/20/91 0 4 / 1 0/ 9 1  04/ l :J/9 1 B  
Prod. o f  Y l  3 1 . 7  32.9 1 i.5 36 21  
Prod.  of Y2 l . i  3 . 6  6.7  0 5 
Prod. of Zl 1 .5 1 5.7  0 5 
Prod. of Z2 28 24.8 18.3 32 22 
Net Exports of Y 14.1  12.4  4 .6 18 0 
Net Exports of Z 1 .8 8.8 1 6 0 
Tables B9-Bll contain information concerning production a.nd exports 
in environment 2. 
TABLE 89: PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXP ORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 2:  ALL PERIOD S  
Experiment Number Comp. Aut . 
1 1 /28/90 1 1 /30/90 1/18/91  
Prod.  of  Y I  9 . 1  9.6 1 1 .4 12 10 
Prod. of Y2 5.:J .5.5 3.9 4 6 
Prod. of Zl 0.:J .5.6 5.6 4 6 
Prod. of Z2 8.1  1 1 .4 9.9 12 10 
Net Exports of Y 1 .8 1 .9 2.8 4 0 
Net Exports of Z 1 . :J :J.8 3.4 4 0 
TABLE BlO:  PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 2 :  PERIODS 1-4 
Ex1wriment Number Comp. Aut 
1 1 /28/90 1 1 /:30/90 1 / 18/91 
Prod. of Y l  8 9.6 9 12 I O  
Prod. o f  Y 2  6 6.8 5 4 6 
Prod. of Zl 6 6.5 4 . . 5 4 6 
Prod. of Z2 8.8 1 1 .8 9 12 10 
Net Exports of Y -0. :J 1 .8 2.2 4 0 
Net Exports of Z 2 .7  3 . 9  2.8 4 0 
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TABLE 8 1 1 :  PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS: 
ENVIRONMENT 2: PERIODS 5 AND GREATER 
Experiment Number Comp. Aut. 
1 1 /28/90 1 1 /30/90 1/18/91 
Prod. of YI 10 9.6 13 12 10 
Prod. of Y2 4.6 4 .9 3.2 4 6 
Prod. of Zl 6.6 5.1 6.3 4 6 
Prod. of Z2 8.6 1 1  10.5 12 10 
Net Exports of Y 3.6 2 3.3 4 0 
Net Exports of Z 0.2 3 ", / 3.8 4 0 
1 .3  Average Market Prices 
The next three nine tables summarize the average contract prices per period 
in each of the experimental sessions for all outputs a.nd inputs. For each of 
the three experimental conditions. three tables are provided. In the first of 
the t hree tables the data is pooled for all periods of the experiments. In the 
second the d<tta for the first four periods is given In the third, the data for 
periods five and greater is given. 
TABLE 812:  PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 1: NO TARIFFS :  
ALL PERIODS 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp. Aut. 
03/05/91 04/01/91 04/ 1 1 /91 04/13/91A 
L I  .562 .5(i9 589 867 720 600 
L2 .522 .522 ,5,52 615 760 520 
Y l  301 31;3 :J40 474 240 200 
Y2 3,50 628 391 .520 
Zl 43:) 52:J 581 571 600 
Z2 440 479 391 566 380 260 
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TABLE B 1 3 :  PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 1: NO TARIFFS:
PERIODS 1-4 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
03/05/91 04/01/9 1  04/ 1 1/ 9 1  04/ 1 3 / 9 1 A  
1 1  5 2 1  527 547 8 1 6  720 600 
12 4 1 8  486 527 586 760 520 
Yl 342 324 . 391 620 240 200 
Y2 350 747 398 520 
Zl 350 540 336 8 1 3  600 
Z2 451 .J9:3 424 665 380 260 
TABLE B 14: PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 1: NO TARIFFS: 
PERIODS 5 AND GREATER 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp. Aut. 
03/05/91 04/01/91 04/ 1 1 /91 04/ 13/91A 
11 .585 603 6 1 7  908 720 
12 642 .5.50 569 639 760 
Yl 277 30.5 307 358 240 
Y2 .532 380 
Zl 500 50.5 714 426 
Z2 4 :34 468 368 487 380 
TABLE B 1 5 :  PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 1: UNDER TAR­
IFFS: ALL PERIODS 
Commodity Experiment. Number Comp. Aut 
03/20/91 04 / 10/91 04/13/9 1 B  
1 1  6 1 2  69.J 529 720 600 
12 284 576 356 360 520 
Y I  26X .J89 317 240 200 
Y2 30.S 5:30 42.J 520 
Zl 604 528 ,537 600 
Z2 2 1 5  .525 406 180 260 
600 
520 
200 
520 
600 
260 
TABLE Bl6: PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 1 :  UNDER TAR­
IFF S :  PERIODS 1-4 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp. Aut 
0.3/20/91 04/10/91 04/ 13/91B 
11 552 570 509 720 600 
12 241 294 342 360 520 
Yl 294 586 373 240 200 
Y2 350 496 426 520 
Zl 451 476 600 
Z2 339 .580 468 180 260 
TABLE Bl 7: PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 1: UNDER TAR­
IFFS: PERIODS 5 AND GREATER 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp. Ant 
03/20/91 04/10/91 04/ 13/9 1 B  
1 1  652 792 543 720 600 
12 3 14 801 36.5 360 .520 
YI 251 4 1 2  380 240 200 
Y2 260 558 423 520 
ZI 60.J 586 573 600 
Z2 199 '181 36.5 180 260 
TABLE B18: PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 2: ALL PERI­
ODS 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp Aut. 
1 1 /28/90 1 1 / 30/90 1 / 1 8/91 
Country 1 
L 292 2 1 1  280 200-250 150 
I\ 282 228 234 200-250 300-350 
y 344 28.5 340 200-225 150 
z 346 287 296 200-225 300-350 
Countr,· 2 
L 2'1 268 218 200-250 300-3.50 
I\ 2.59 2.56 2 1 1  200-250 150 
y 340 308 325 200-225 300-3.50 
z 324 :J06 306 200-225 150 
TABLE B19: PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 2 :  PERIODS 1-4 
Commodity Experiment. Number Comp Aut 
1 1 /28/90 l l j:J0/90 1 / 18/91 
Country 1 
L 3J.5 201 322 200-250 150 
I\ 3 1 1  224 279 200-250 300-350 
y 4:32 3.56 4 1 7  200-225 1 .50 
z 423 3 1 7  365 200-225 300-350 
Country 2 
L 308 290 :3 1 7  200-2.50 300-350 
I\ 288 27 j 2 1 3  200-250 150 
y 401 :356 382 200-225 300-350 
z :JGG :3:lc; :341  200-225 1.50 
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TABLE B20: PRICES IN ENVIRONMENT 2: PERIODS 5 
AND GREATER 
Commodity Experiment Number Comp - --.- Aut 
1 1/28/90 1 1 /30/90 1/18/91 
Country 1 
L 258 2 1 3  250 200-250 150 
K 252 230 203 200-250 300-350 
y 274 26 1 286 200-225 150 
z 28.5 270 265 200-225 300-3.50 
Country 2 
L 243 268 258 200-250 300-350 
K 236 246 220 200-250 150 
y 289 28 1 290 200-225 300-3.50 
z 291 289 28.5 200-225 150 
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Appendix C 
This appendix provides, for each of the two environments, a calculation of 
the competitive equilibrium of a continuous set of parameters of which the 
experimental parameters are an approximation. 
1 .1 Environment 1 
Initial endowments of consumers are L1 = 12, L2 = 16 .  L1 and L2 are inelas­
tically supplied. 
The production technologies are: � = 3, � = 1, � = 1, � = 2 
All producers have the utility function: u(m) = m, (m = cash). 
Aggregatt <npply of Y. Z is: l j = L1 * � = 36, Z2 = £2 * � = 32, Y2 = 
O, Z1 = 0 .  
Each consumer's utility funct.ion is: 
60ol · - 40Y' + 700Z - 40Z2 + m = U ( Y, Z, m ) 
Therefore. each consumer's marginal utilities are: 
Aggregate demand is: 
d[ ' 
ai · = GOO - SOY
iJL' 
iJZ = iOO - SOY
au 
rJm = 1 
AD( l ' )  = 600 - !OY 
AD(Z)  = 700 - !OZ 
AD( m )  = 1 
Aggregate demand in each country is: 
AD(Y) = 600 - 20Y 
AD( Z )  = 700 - 20Z 
AD(m) = 1 
Equilibrium output and price are: 
i ·· = 36, z· = 32
P1� ( l'" ) = 600 - l O ( Y " )  = 240 
Pz( Z" ) = 700 - lO(Z" )  = 380 
Input prices equal their marginal revenue product. Therefore: 
P• p· 8l i ·J40 ·3 790L, = l'  fJL1 
= - * . = -
az Pi, = Pz aL: = 380 * 2 = 760 
1 . 2  Environment 2 
Initial endowments of consumers are: L1 = /\2 = 20 and I<1 = L2 = 1 2
The production technologies are: � = 1 ELL = 1 £11 = 1 £h - ) ctL1 ' 8/\ 1 , 8L2 ' aA·2 -
Each producer in country i (i = 1 ,2 )  has utility function: 
11( L; ,  !\;, m) = GOOL, - !OOL7 + 6001\; - !OOI<f + m 
Therefore. each producer"s marginal utilities are: 
au 
dL, = GOO - 200L,
i)(' = 600 - 2001\; 
iJh', 
2 
au - = lom 
Therefore, aggregate demand for consumption of the inputs is: 
AD(L;)  = 600 - 25L;
AD(l\"; ) = 700 - 25K; 
AD(m) = l
The supply curves of '{ and Z for each of the four producers in country
are: 
S ( Y, )  = 0: } j  $ 2. -400 + 200} j ;  }j > 2 
S( Zi l  = 2ooz, 
The supply curves of Y am! Z for each of the four producers in country 2 
are: 
so i l = 2om ; 
S ( Z2 )  = 0: Z2 $ 2. -400 + 20022 ; Z2 > 2 
Aggregate supply in country 1 is:
AS( 1 i )  = 0: l i  $ 8. -400 + .50} j ; } j > S 
AS( Zi ) = 50Z1 
Aggregate supply in country 2 is: 
AS( } i )  = 501'2 
AS( Z2 )  = 0: Z2 $ 8. -400 + .50Z2 ; Z2 > S 
Aggregate world supply of Y and Z is:
AS( Y )  = 0: 1 ·  $ 8, -200 + 2.5 1 · ; 1 ·  > 8 
AS'( Z )  = 0: Z $ 8, -200 + 2.5Z;  Z > 8 
Each consumer's utility function is :  
600 l ' - 100} · 2  + GOOZ - 1 0022 + m = U(Y, Z, m) 
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